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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the central principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—though how this aligns with the new military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This shift is significant, but analysts note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Friction

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Selective Involvement

A comparable standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” she added.